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Abstract 
Is the European nation-state system more favorable to economic growth than the united-empire 
system in ancient China? This paper develops an endogenous-growth model to analyze the conditions 
under which economic growth is higher under political fragmentation than political unification. Under 
political unification, the economy is vulnerable to excessive Leviathan taxation and the costs of unifying 
heterogeneous populations. Under political fragmentation, the competing rulers are constrained in 
taxation but spend excessively on military defense. If and only if the heterogeneity costs are sufficiently 
high relative to the mobility cost of citizens or equilibrium defense spending, then political fragmentation 
would be more favorable to growth than political unification. When the political regime is endogenously 
chosen by rulers, they do not always choose the growth-maximizing regime. In particular, there exists a 
range of values for the heterogeneity costs, in which political fragmentation is more favorable to growth 
but the rulers prefer political unification.  
 
 
 
 
Keywords: endogenous growth, Leviathan taxation, interstate competition, endogenous political regime  
JEL classification: D72, H20, H56, O41, O43 
                                                 
*
 Institute of Economics, Academia Sinica, Taipei, Taiwan. Email address: angusccc@econ.sinica.edu.tw. I would 
like to thank Cyrus Chu, Wei-Torng Juang, Chi-Yuan Liang, Meng-Yu Liang, Dmitriy Stolyarov, Cheng-Chen 
Yang and seminar participants at Academia Sinica for their insightful comments and very helpful suggestions. All 
errors are, of course, mine. 
 - 1 - 
1. Introduction 
Is the European nation-state system more favorable to economic growth than the united-empire system in 
ancient China? A number of economic historians, such as North (1981) and Jones (1981), argue that the 
unique European nation-state system contributed to its economic takeoff in the late 18th and early 19th 
century while the united-empire system in China was responsible for its economic stagnation during that 
period. 1  For example, North (1981) suggests that the interstate competition arising from political 
fragmentation induces the competing rulers to recognize private property rights in order to prevent labor 
and human-capital outflows, and the resulting economic system with secured property rights creates the 
proper environment for capital accumulation and hence sustained growth. However, Bernolz and Vaubel 
(2004) note that political fragmentation did not always lead to these predicted effects.  
“Political fragmentation is not a sufficient condition for political competition, innovation 
and growth… Political fragmentation will not lead to interstate competition unless there 
is considerable mobility among jurisdictions… Political fragmentation will not favour 
innovation and growth if it leads to prolonged and highly destructive wars rather than 
limited warfare or peaceful competition for manpower and capital.”  
Bernolz and Vaubel (2004, p. 14) 
So, under what conditions would political fragmentation be more favorable to economic growth than 
political unification? Also, given that political regimes are endogenous, why did so many ancient 
civilizations adopt the united-empire system if the nation-state system would have been more favorable to 
economic growth?  
 To answer these questions, this paper develops an endogenous-growth model, in which the 
equilibrium growth rate is a function of the investment rate chosen by citizens and the income-tax rate 
chosen by rulers,2 and uses the model to analyze the conditions under which economic growth is higher 
                                                 
1
 See, for example, Bernholz et al (1998) and Bernholz and Vaubel (2004) for a comprehensive survey. 
2
 This formulation of using taxation as a measure of property rights is motivated by Drazen’s (2000, p. 459) 
obersvation that “… property rights can be considered in the narrow sense as applying to taxation of property: even 
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under political fragmentation than political unification. On one hand, political fragmentation can be 
advantageous to growth because the competition between rulers limits their ability in taxing citizens. The 
degree of this limitation is governed by the mobility cost of citizens, and this mobility cost is meant to 
capture North’s (1981) idea that the monopoly power of a ruler depends on the opportunity cost of exit for 
the citizens. On the other hand, political fragmentation can be damaging to growth if the competing rulers 
allocate an excessive amount of productive resources to military defense. In the case of political 
unification, the level of output and economic growth are reduced by the costs of unifying heterogeneous 
populations into a single country.3 
 In summary, under political unification, the economy is vulnerable to excessive Leviathan 
taxation and the heterogeneity costs. Under political fragmentation, the competing rulers are constrained 
in taxation but spend excessively on military defense. The theoretical analysis suggests that whether 
political fragmentation or political unification is more favorable to growth depends on the relative 
magnitude of the heterogeneity costs, the mobility cost of citizens and the equilibrium amount of defense 
spending. If and only if the heterogeneity costs are sufficiently high relative to the mobility cost or 
defense spending, then political fragmentation would be more favorable to growth than political 
unification. Furthermore, as the ruler becomes more impatient, the parameter space in which political 
fragmentation is more favorable to growth increases. Intuitively, as the ruler becomes more impatient, 
he/she would prefer to levy a higher tax rate; therefore, it becomes more likely for the competition 
between rulers that limits taxation to provide a more favorable effect on growth.  
When the political regime is endogenously chosen by the rulers, they do not always choose the 
growth-maximizing regime. In particular, there exists a range of values for the heterogeneity costs, in 
which political fragmentation is more favorable to growth but the rulers prefer political unification. On 
one hand, when the heterogeneity costs are sufficiently high, economic growth is higher under political 
                                                                                                                                                             
in the absence of the threat of outright expropriation, societies can nonetheless legally expropriate the fruits of 
accumulation via taxation.” 
3
 The inclusion of these heterogeneity costs is meant to capture some of the insights from the literature on country 
formation. See, for example, Alesina and Spolaore (2003) for a comprehensive discussion on this literature. 
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fragmentation than political unification. On the other hand, the rulers suffer from a reduction in the level 
of tax revenue under political fragmentation because the mobility of citizens sets an upper limit on the tax 
rate. When the heterogeneity costs are not excessively high, this negative level effect dominates the 
positive growth effect and the emperors enjoy a higher level of utility under political unification. In this 
case, although political fragmentation favors growth, political unification arises as the equilibrium 
outcome when the rulers have all the political power. As for the citizens, they always prefer the political 
regime that is more favorable to growth; therefore, there are situations in which the citizens and the rulers 
prefer different political regimes. 
 
Related Literatures  
This paper relates to a number of literatures: (a) institutional economics and economic history; (b) 
endogenous-growth theory; (c) the political economy of Leviathan taxation; (d) the literature on country 
formation; and (e) the political economy of growth. This paper formalizes the insights from a number of 
economic historians on the effects of political fragmentation on growth using a version of the so-called 
AK endogenous-growth model.4 In particular, it embeds a framework of Leviathan taxation into the 
growth model to analyze the conditions under which the mobility of citizens would constrain the tax rate 
chosen by Leviathans and enhance growth under political fragmentation.5 Furthermore, it borrows some 
of the insights from the literature on country formation to analyze the different growth effects of political 
fragmentation and political unification. Alesina and Spolaore (2005) analyze how the heterogeneity costs 
and the cost of international conflict affect the size and the number of nations.6 In contrast, the current 
paper firstly analyzes how these factors affect economic growth for a given size and number of nations. 
                                                 
4
 See, for example, Rebelo (1991) for a discussion on the different versions of the AK model. 
5
 See, for example, Brennan and Buchanan (1977) and Grossman and Noh (1994) for studies in the political 
economy of Leviathan taxation. 
6
 See, also, Alesina and Spolaore (2003, chapters 7 and 8).  
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Then, it considers whether the political regime that is more favorable to growth would emerge as the 
political equilibrium outcome.7 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the model and results. The 
final section concludes with a discussion on the implications of the model.  
 
2. The Model 
There is a continuum of identical households residing in each of the two symmetric regions. In the case of 
political unification, the level of output decreases by a fraction h that captures the heterogeneity costs in 
unifying two heterogeneous populations.8 The unified country is ruled by an emperor, who chooses a time 
path for the income-tax rate and consumes the tax revenue to maximize his/her lifetime utility. Taking the 
time path for the tax rate as given, the households choose a time path for consumption and investment to 
maximize their lifetime utility. For this differential game,9 I will derive the time-consistent open-loop 
Stackelberg equilibrium,10 in which the emperor is the leader and the representative household is the 
follower. Because of constant returns to scale with respect to the cumulative input factor in the production 
function, the output growth rate is determined by the households’ investment rate and the tax rate.  
 In the case of political fragmentation, each of the two countries is ruled by an emperor, who 
makes an additional decision on the amount of defense spending for the purpose of capturing a larger 
amount of land, which is a productive factor input. The two emperors are assumed to play this game with 
simultaneous moves, and I will derive the symmetric open-loop Nash equilibrium for this differential 
                                                 
7
 See, for example, Drazen (2000, chapter 11), Persson and Tabellini (2000, chapter 14) and Acemoglu (2008, 
chapters 22 and 23) for excellent surveys in the political economy of growth. Chaudhry and Garner (2006) model 
another interesting effect of political competition in which the presence of rival states reduces the rulers’ incentives 
to block innovation and enhances growth. The current paper differs from their study by analyzing a completely 
different growth-enhancing channel of political competition in an infinite-horizon dynamic general-equilibrium 
model and taking the political regime as endogenous.  
8
 Potential sources of these costs include conflicting preferences over public policies, coordination costs, monitoring 
costs, or even the expected losses associated with civil wars. See, for example, Alesina and Spolaore (2003, 2005). 
9
 See, for example, Dockner et al (2000) for a comprehensive discussion on differential games. 
10
 An open-loop strategy is a time path that assigns a value for the control variable in every period given the initial 
value of the state variable. See, for example, Pohjola (1983a, 1983b) and Cellini and Lambertini (1998, 2002) for 
applications of open-loop solution concepts in dynamic models. Also, see, for example, Xie (1997) and Karp and 
Lee (2003) for a discussion of time-consistency in open-loop Stackelberg differential games.  
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game. The households also have to make an additional decision on the residential location. For the 
households from one region to move to the other region, they face a mobility cost that reduces their 
output by a fraction m. The magnitude of this mobility cost sets an upper limit on the tax rate chosen by 
the emperors. For a low value of m, the emperors have to set a lower tax rate than desired in order to 
prevent the outflows of labor and human capital.  
  
Households 
There is a continuum of representative households on the unit interval in region },{ baj ∈ , and their 
lifetime utility is  
(1) ∫
∞
−
=
0
)(ln)( . dtjCejU ttρ ,  
where )( jCt  denotes the level of consumption for a household in region j at time t, and )1,0(∈ρ  is the 
household’s subjective discount rate. To simplify notation, I will suppress the regional index j. In each 
period, the households use their human capital tH  to produce goods, and they decide how much to 
consume and invest in human capital by maximizing utility subject to a sequence of budget constraints 
given by  
(2) δτ ttttt HCYH −−−= )1(& ,  
where tτ  is the income-tax rate and )1,0[∈δ  is the depreciation rate of human capital. tY  is the amount 
of goods produced. Following the literature on AK endogenous growth, the production is assumed to have 
constant returns to scale with respect to the cumulative input factor such that ttt HAY = . To incorporate 
some interesting elements from the country-formation literature into the model, the level of productivity 
denoted by tA  is assumed to be a function of land tL  and the heterogeneity costs )1,0(∈h  given by  
(3) ttt LhA )1( γ−= .  
tγ  is an 0-1 indicator that equals 1 for political unification and equals 0 for political fragmentation. 
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Emperor(s) 
Under political unification, there is an emperor ruling the unified country. Under political fragmentation, 
there are two non-cooperative emperors ruling the two independent countries. An emperor’s utility is  
(4) ∫
∞
−
=
0
ln~ . dtTeU t
tβ
,  
where tT  is the tax revenue net of defense spending, and )1,0(∈β  is the emperor’s discount rate.  
 
Political Unification 
In the case of political unification, the emperor allocates the amount of land equally among the two 
populations. The amount of goods produced in each region is tt HhY )1( −= , where the total amount of 
land is normalized to two. Because the emperor incurs zero defense spending, the amount of tax revenue 
consumed by him/herself is ttt YT τ=  from each region. Denote tc  as the fraction of after-tax income 
consumed by the households (i.e. tttt YcC )1( τ−= ) and tc−1  as the fraction invested in human capital. 
Taking the time path of tτ  as given, the households choose the time path of tc  to maximize (1) subject to 
(2). Taking the households’ best response as given, the emperor chooses the time path of tτ  to maximize 
(4) subject to (2). Lemma 1 shows that the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is time consistent. 
 
Lemma 1: Under political unification, the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is time consistent and the 
equilibrium outcomes for all t are  
(5) )1)(1( hc ut
u
t
−−
=
τ
ρ
,  
(6) )1/( hut −= βτ ,  
(7) )(1)()1)(1( δρβδρτ +++−=+−−−= hhg utut .  
Proof: See Appendix A.□  
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tg  is the equilibrium growth rate of per capita output, and I will suppress the time subscript. Firstly, 
ug  
is decreasing in ρ  because an increase in ρ  reduces the investment rate in human capital. Secondly, ug  
is decreasing in β  because an increase in β  leads to a higher tax rate that reduces the rate of return on 
human capital. Finally, ug  is decreasing in h  and δ  because they reduce the net rate of return on human 
capital. To ensure that the equilibrium is well-behaved, the following parameter conditions are assumed.   
(a1) βδρβ 2)(1 <++−⇔< hg u ,  
(a2) ρδβρρ 2)(10 <++−≤⇔<≤ hg u .  
(a1) ensures that the lifetime utility of the emperor is bounded. The second inequality in (a2) ensures that 
the lifetime utility of households is bounded while the first inequality in (a2) ensures that the growth rate 
is non-negative.  
 
Political Fragmentation 
Under political fragmentation, total output in each region is ttttt HsHLY )2(== , where ts  denotes the 
share of land claimed by an emperor. The two emperors incur defense spending to fight over the 
distribution of land. The gross amount of tax revenue from each region is ttYτ , and the fraction of output 
spent on defense is denoted by td  (i.e. the net amount of tax revenue consumed by an emperor is 
tttt YdT )( −= τ ). The share of land claimed by an emperor is assumed to be )/( tttt ddds ′+= ,11 where 
td ′  is the other emperor’s decision on the fraction of output spent on defense. Taking the time paths of tτ  
and ts  as given, the households choose the time path of tc  to maximize (1) subject to (2). Then, taking 
the households’ best response and the time path of td ′  as given, an emperor chooses the time paths of tτ  
and td  to maximize (4) subject to (2). In other words, in addition to the open-loop Stackelberg game 
                                                 
11
 Following Alesina and Spolaore (2005), this simple functional form is assumed for analytical tractability, and this 
specification on the conflict resolution technology is a special case of the more general functional forms used in the 
literature on conflict resolution. See, for example, Hirshleifer (1991). 
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between each pair of the households and the emperor, the two emperors also play an open-loop 
simultaneous-move game, and I will focus on the symmetric equilibrium (i.e. tt dd ′=  for all t). 12 
Furthermore, the households now have the option to move to the other country. When the households 
move, their output of goods decreases by a fraction )1,0(∈m . Suppose the emperors have the flexibility 
in levying different tax rates on domestic households and immigrants. Then, the constraint that prevents 
labor and human-capital outflows is mt ≤τ  for domestic households. The emperors would lower the tax 
rate for immigrants to zero but still fail to attract labor and human-capital inflows.  
 
Lemma 2: Under political fragmentation, the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is time consistent. For 
all t, the (symmetric) equilibrium outcomes of the open-loop simultaneous-move game between the 
emperors and the open-loop Stackelberg game between each pair of the households and the emperor are 
(8) )2)(1( tft
f
t
s
c
τ
ρ
−
= , 
(9) )3/1,min( += βτ mft , 
(10) )(1 δρτ ++−= ftftg . 
For 3/1+> βm , 3/1=td . For 3/1+≤ βm , 3/131
1 ≤





+−
+−
= β
β
m
m
mdt . For )1,0(∈m , 5.0=ts .  
Proof: See Appendix A.□  
 
Intuitively, if the mobility cost is sufficiently high, then the emperors would choose a gross tax rate that is 
equal to the sum of their desired net tax rate given by β  and the equilibrium amount of defense spending 
given by 3/1=d . If the mobility cost is sufficiently low, then the emperors would be forced to set a 
                                                 
12
 In the proof for Lemma 2, I show that for the case in which the mobility constraint is not binding, there exist only 
symmetric solutions for the open-loop simultaneous-move game and there is only one stable solution. However, for 
the case in which the mobility constraint is binding, I need to impose the symmetry condition in order to find the 
solution because the best response functions are highly non-linear.  
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lower tax rate and allocate a smaller amount of resources to defense spending. To ensure that the 
equilibrium is well-behaved, the following parameter conditions are assumed.   
(a3) ββδρβ <+−+−⇔< )3/1,min()(1 mg f ,  
(a4) ρβδρρ 2)3/1,min(10 <+−−≤⇔<≤ mg f ,  
The interpretations for (a3) and (a4) are analogous to the ones for (a1) and (a2). 
 
Growth Effects of Political Fragmentation vs. Political Unification 
The condition that determines whether economic growth is higher under political fragmentation or 
political unification is given by  
(11) βββτ −+>⇔−>⇔> )3/1,min(mhhgg fuf .  
In other words, political fragmentation is more favorable to growth than political unification if and only if 
the heterogeneity costs are sufficiently high. When the mobility cost is not a binding constraint (i.e. 
3/1+> βm ), the relevant comparison is between the relative magnitude of the heterogeneity costs and 
the equilibrium amount of defense spending given by 3/1=d . When the mobility cost becomes a 
binding constraint, the relevant comparison is between the relative magnitude of the heterogeneity costs 
and the mobility cost that limits the tax rate chosen by the emperors. In this case, as an emperor becomes 
more impatient, he/she would prefer to levy a higher tax rate; as a result, the parameter space in which 
political fragmentation is more favorable to growth than political unification increases. These results are 
summarized in Proposition 1, Figure 1 and Corollary 1.  
 
Proposition 1: For 3/1+> βm , political fragmentation is more favorable to growth than political 
unification if and only if 3/1=> dh . For 3/1+≤ βm , political fragmentation is more favorable to 
growth than political unification if and only if β−> mh . 
Proof: Note (11).□ 
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Corollary 1: For 3/1+≤ βm , an increase in β  enlarges the parameter space in which political 
fragmentation is more favorable to growth than political unification. 
Proof: Note (11).□ 
  
Endogenous Political Regime 
Suppose the political regime is chosen by the emperors. Then, which political regime do they prefer? In 
particular, this section considers whether the emperors would always prefer the political regime that is 
more favorable to growth. Because this simple version of the AK model does not exhibit transition 
dynamics, the lifetime utility of an emperor can be simplified to 
(12) 20
0
0
ln)ln(~ .. ββ
β gTdteTeU tgt +== ∫
∞
−
.  
In the case of political fragmentation, the initial level of tax revenue is 00 )( HdT ff −= τ , where 0H  is 
the exogenously given stock of human capital at time 0 and is normalized to 1 without loss of generality. 
As for the case of political unification, it requires an additional assumption on the revenue sharing 
between the two emperors. A natural benchmark is the following.  
 
Figure 1: Results of Proposition 1 
m 
h 1/3 
β 
β +1/3 
fragmentation 
fragmentation 
unification 
unification 
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Assumption: In the case of political unification, the two emperors cooperate together to rule the unified 
country and share the tax revenue equally.  
 
Given this setting, the initial level of tax revenue consumed by each emperor is 00 )1( HhT uu −= τ . 
Substituting uT0 , 
uτ  and ug  into (12) yields (13), in which uU~  denotes the lifetime utility of each 
emperor under political unification. 
(13) 22
)(1ln))1(ln(~
β
δρβ
β
β
ββ
τ +++−
+=+
−
=
hghU
uu
u
.  
As for the lifetime utility of an emperor under political fragmentation, it depends on whether the mobility 
cost is a binding constraint. For 3/1+> βm , substituting fT0 , fτ , d  and fg  into (12) yields  
(14) 22
)3/1(1ln)ln(~
β
δρβ
β
β
ββ
τ +++−
+=+
−
=
ff
f gdU .  
 
Proposition 2: For 3/1+> βm , uf UU ~~ >  if and only if uf gg > . 
Proof: Note (13) and (14).□ 
 
In other words, when the mobility cost is not a binding constraint, the emperors would choose the 
political regime that is more favorable to growth. Intuitively, the two political regimes affect an emperor’s 
utility through a level effect and a growth effect, and the level effect is reflected in the initial level of tax 
revenue. In the case of political unification, uT0  is potentially reduced by the heterogeneity costs, but the 
emperor sets )1/( hu −= βτ  to offset this effect. In the case of political fragmentation, fT0  is potentially 
reduced by the equilibrium amount of defense spending, but the emperor sets df += βτ  to offset this 
effect as well. Therefore, it turns out that fu TT 00 = , so that only the growth effect is present.  
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When the mobility cost is a binding constraint (i.e. 3/1+< βm ), substituting fT0 , fτ , d  and 
fg  into (12) yields  
(15) 22
)(1
2
31ln1ln)ln(~ β
δρβ
ββ
β
ββ
τ ++−
+




 +−
−=+
−
=
m
m
mgdU
ff
f
.  
The extra term given by 0)2/)31ln((1 >+−− mm ββ  for 3/1+< βm  reflects an emperor’s utility loss 
from being unable to choose the desired tax rate. The mobility of citizens constraining the tax rate results 
into a negative level effect through the reduction in the level of tax revenue. Because of this negative 
level effect, the emperors may have a lower level of utility under political fragmentation even when this 
political regime is more favorable to growth. Proposition 3 and Figure 2 summarize this finding.  
 
Proposition 3: For 3/1+< βm , there exists a range of parameters, in which uf gg >  but  uf UU ~~ < . 
This range of parameters is given by ),( hmh β−∈ , where )2/)31ln(( mmmh βββ +−+−≡ . 
Proof: From Proposition 1, β−>⇔> mhgg uf . From (13) and (15), hhUU uf <⇔< ~~ . When 
3/1+< βm , β−> mh  for any value of )1,0(∈m  and )1,0(∈β . Therefore, ),( hmh β−∈  is a non-
empty parameter space.□ 
 
 
 
Intuitively, when the heterogeneity costs are sufficiently high such that β−> mh , the growth rate is 
higher under political fragmentation than political unification. However, when the mobility cost is a 
binding constraint, the emperors also suffer from a negative level effect under political fragmentation. 
Figure 2: Results of Proposition 3 
h 
   0 
 
uf gg <  
1 β−m  h  
   
uf gg >  
   
uf UU ~~ <       uf UU ~~ >  
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When the heterogeneity costs are not excessively high such that hh < , this negative level effect 
dominates the positive growth effect, and the emperors enjoy a higher level of utility under political 
unification. Figure 3 plots the equilibrium growth rate for 3/1+< βm  when the political regime is 
endogenously chosen by the emperors to maximize their utility.  
 
 
 
Welfare of Households 
As for the households, they always prefer the political regime that is more favorable to growth. To see 
this result, the lifetime utility of a household is re-expressed as  
(16) 20
0
0
ln)ln( .. ρρ
ρ gCdteCeU tgt +== ∫
∞
−
.  
Denote the household’s lifetime utility under political fragmentation and under political unification by 
fU  and uU  respectively.  
 
Proposition 4: uf UU >  if and only if uf gg > . 
Proof: Firstly, note that 00 )2)(1)(1( . HshcC γτ −−= . Then, from (5) and (8), 000 , HCC uf ρ== .□  
 
Figure 3: Equilibrium Growth under Endogenous Political Regime 
h 
0 1 β−m  h  
   
uf UU ~~ <       uf UU ~~ >  
g 
)(1 δρβ +++−= hg u  
)(1 δρ ++−= mg f  
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The initial level of consumption 0C  is potentially affected by the income-tax rate τ  and the level of 
productivity )2)(1(
.0 shA γ−= . However, as shown in (5) and (8), the households always choose 
))1/(( 0Ac τρ −=  to offset these effects and consume a fraction ρ  of the human-capital stock. Because 
the households always prefer the growth-maximizing regime, there are situations in which the households 
and the emperors prefer different political regimes. Corollary 2 summarizes this finding. 
 
Corollary 2: For 3/1+< βm , there exists a range of parameters given by ),( hmh β−∈ , in which 
uf UU >  but uf UU ~~ < . 
Proof: It follows from Proposition 3 and Proposition 4.□  
 
3. Conclusion 
This paper develops an endogenous-growth model to analyze the conditions under which economic 
growth is higher under political fragmentation than political unification. In order to formalize the different 
growth effects of each political regime in a theoretical model, I have made a number of simplifying 
assumptions and used specific functional forms. The simple model certainly does not capture all the 
important elements of the nation-state and united-empire systems but nonetheless serves the useful 
purpose in providing a simple framework that highlights the different growth effects of the heterogeneity 
costs under political unification and the interstate competition in taxation and defense spending under 
political fragmentation.  
I believe that the following insights are more general than my specific model. Under political 
unification, the heterogeneity costs have a negative effect on the economy. Under political fragmentation, 
the interstate competition in defense spending has a negative effect on the economy while the mobility of 
citizens constraining the tax rate chosen by rulers has a positive effect. Although the abstract model may 
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have neglected other important characteristics of each political regime,13 whether political fragmentation 
or political unification is more favorable to growth should be at least partly determined by the relative 
magnitude of the above three factors. Furthermore, when the political regime is chosen by the rulers, they 
do not necessarily choose the growth-maximizing regime. This finding potentially explains why so many 
ancient civilizations, except for Europe, adopted the united-empire system while the nation-state system 
might have been more favorable to economic growth. Perhaps the heterogeneity costs in Europe were 
higher than, for example, in ancient China such that the European rulers found political fragmentation 
optimal while the Chinese rulers found political unification optimal despite the possibility that political 
fragmentation would have been more favorable to growth and preferred by the citizens. 
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Appendix A 
Lemma 1: Under political unification, the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is time consistent and the 
equilibrium outcomes for all t are 
(A1) )1)(1( hc ut
u
t
−−
=
τ
ρ
,  
(A2) )1/( hut −= βτ ,  
(A3) )(1)()1)(1( δρβδρτ +++−=+−−−= hhg utut .  
Proof: Taking the time path of tτ  as given, the representative household chooses the time path of tC  to 
maximize (1) subject to (2). The current-value Hamiltonian for the representative household is 
(A4) ]))1)(1[((ln tttttt CHhC −−−−+=Η δτµ .  
The first-order conditions are 
(A5) 01 =−=
∂
Η∂
t
tt
t
CC
µ ,  
(A6) tttt
t
t h
H
µρµδτµ &−=−−−=
∂
Η∂ ))1)(1(( ,  
(A7) tttt
t
t HCHh &=−−−−=
∂
Η∂ ))1)(1(( δτ
µ
,  
and the transversality condition is  
(A8) 0lim . =−
∞→
tt
t
t
He µρ .  
Combining (A5), (A6) and (A7) yields 
(A9) 1. −=+ tttttt HHH µρµµ && .  
Integrating (A9) with respect to time yield ρµ ρ /1. +Ω= ttt eH , and (A8) implies that the integration 
constant Ω  must equal zero. Therefore, we have   
(A10) 1)(
.
−
= tt Hρµ .  
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From (A10), 100 )( . −= Hρµ  is independent of the emperor’s chosen path of tτ . In this case, the 
emperor’s control problem has only one state variable tH  that has a predetermined initial value 0H . The 
solution to this control problem satisfies the dynamic programming Principle of Optimality; therefore, the 
open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is time-consistent. Combining (A5) and (A10) yields  
(A11) tt HC .ρ= .  
Substituting (A11) into (A7) and then integrating the resulting expression with respect to time yield 
(A12) 






+−−−= ∫
t
st dshHH
0
0 )]()1)(1[(exp ρδτ .  
Substituting (A12) into (A11) shows that tC  is independent of the future tax rates. The fraction of after-
tax income consumed is ))1)(1/(())1/(( hYCc ttttt −−=−≡ τρτ . Substituting (A11) into (A7) shows 
that )()1)(1(/ δρτ +−−−=≡ hHHg tttt & . 
 Taking the household’s best response as given, the emperor chooses the time path of tτ  to 
maximize (4) subject to (A6) and (A7) (i.e. treating tµ  as a state variable in the optimization problem). 
To simplify the derivation, I will directly substitute (A11) into (A7) in order to eliminate (A6) in the 
emperor’s optimization problem. The current-value Hamiltonian for the emperor is 
(A13)    tttttt HhHh )]()1)(1[(~))1(ln(~ δρτµτ +−−−+−=Η .  
The first-order conditions are 
(A14) 0)1(~1
~
=−−=
∂
Η∂
tt
tt
t Hhµ
ττ
,  
(A15) tttt
tt
t h
HH
µβµδρτµ &~~)]()1)(1[(~1
~
−=+−−−+=
∂
Η∂
,  
(A16) ttt
t
t HHh &=+−−−=
∂
Η∂ )]()1)(1[(
~
~
δρτ
µ
,  
and the transversality condition is 
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(A17) 0~lim . =−
→∞
tt
t
t
He µβ . 
As before, combining (A15) and (A16), integrating the resulting expression with respect to time and then 
using (A17) to set the integration constant to zero yield 
(A18) 1)(~
.
−
= tt Hβµ .  
Substituting (A18) into (A14) yields 
(A19) )1/( ht −= βτ . 
Finally, substituting (A19) into (A16) yields 
(A20) )(1 δρβ +++−= hgt .□ 
 
Lemma 2: Under political fragmentation, the open-loop Stackelberg equilibrium is time consistent. For 
all t, the (symmetric) equilibrium outcomes of the open-loop simultaneous-move game between the 
emperors and the open-loop Stackelberg game between each pair of the households and the emperor are 
(A21) )2)(1( tft
f
t
s
c
τ
ρ
−
= , 
(A22) )3/1,min( += βτ mft , 
(A23) )(1 δρτ ++−= ftftg . 
For 3/1+> βm , 3/1=td . For 3/1+≤ βm , 3/131
1 ≤





+−
+−
= β
β
m
m
mdt . For )1,0(∈m , 5.0=ts . 
Proof: Taking the time paths of tτ  and ts  as given, the representative household chooses the time path of 
tC  to maximize (1) subject to (2). The current-value Hamiltonian for the representative household is  
(A24) ]))2)(1[((ln ttttttt CHsC −−−+=Η δτµ .  
The first-order conditions are 
(A25) 01 =−=
∂
Η∂
t
tt
t
CC
µ ,  
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(A26) ttttt
t
t s
H
µρµδτµ &−=−−=
∂
Η∂ ))2)(1(( ,  
(A27) ttttt
t
t HCHs &=−−−=
∂
Η∂ ))2)(1(( δτ
µ
,  
and the transversality condition is  
(A28) 0lim . =−
∞→
tt
t
t
He µρ .  
Following the same derivation as in the proof for Lemma 1 yields 
(A29) 1)( . −= tt Hρµ .  
Therefore, 100 )( . −= Hρµ  is independent of the emperor’s chosen path of tτ , and hence, the open-loop 
Stackelberg equilibrium is time-consistent. Combining (A25) and (A29) yields 
(A30) tt HC .ρ= .  
Therefore, the fraction of after-tax income consumed is ))2)(1/(( ttt sc τρ −= . Also, substituting (A30) 
into (A27) yields )()2)(1(/ δρτ +−−=≡ ttttt sHHg & . 
 Taking the household’s best response and the time path of td ′  as given, the emperor chooses the 
time paths of tτ  and td  to maximize (4) subject to (A26) and (A27). Again, I will substitute (A30) into 
(A27) to eliminate (A26) in the optimization problem. The current-value Hamiltonian for the emperor is   
(A31) t
tt
t
ttt
tt
t
ttt Hdd
dH
dd
dd 



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
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
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The first-order conditions are 
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(A34) tt
tt
t
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tt
t
dd
d
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µβµδρτµ &~~)(2)1(~1
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t HH
dd
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and the transverality condition is  
(A36) 0~lim . =−
→∞
tt
t
t
He µβ . 
As before, combining (A34) and (A35), integrating the resulting expression with respect to time and then 
using (A36) to set the integration constant to zero yield 
(A37) 1)(~
.
−
= tt Hβµ .  
Substituting (A37) into (A32) yields 
(A38) t
t
tt
t dd
dd
+




 ′+
=
2
βτ . 
Substituting (A37) and (A38) into (A33) and then simplifying the resulting expression yield 
(A39) 0)2()( 2 =′−′+ tttt dddd . 
The solutions to this quadratic equation are )1( tttt dddd ′+′±′−= , from which the negative root can be 
eliminated. Therefore, the pair of best response functions is given by   
(A40) )1( tttt dddd ′+′+′−= , 
(A41) )1( tttt dddd ++−=′ . 
Solving (A40) and (A41) yields the stable solution given by  
(A42) 3/1=′= tt dd ,  
and the unstable solution is 0=′= tt dd  that can be eliminated. Substituting (A42) into (A38) yields 
3/1+= βτ t . Then, substituting (A42) into (A35) yields )(1 δρτ ++−= ttg .  
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 Now suppose 3/1+≤ βm . (A32) shows that the marginal benefit of tτ  is monotonically 
decreasing in tτ ; therefore, the mobility constraint is binding such that mt =τ  for all t. Then, (A32) 
drops out of the first-order conditions, and substituting mt =τ  into (A33) – (A35) yields   
(A43) 0)(
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As before, combining (A44) and (A45), integrating the resulting expression with respect to time and then 
using (A36) to set the integration constant to zero yield (A37). Then, substituting (A37) into (A43) and 
imposing the symmetry condition (i.e. tt dd ′= ) yield 
(A46) 
3
1
31
1 ≤
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

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+−
=′= β
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mdd tt  
as the solution for 3/1+≤ βm . Finally, substituting (A46) into (A45) yields )(1 δρ ++−= mgt .□ 
